Summary
The UserTokenMiddleware extracts URLs from X-Atlassian-Jira-Url and X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url HTTP headers and passes them directly to API client constructors without any SSRF validation.
Affected Package
- Ecosystem: PyPI
- Package: mcp-atlassian
- Affected versions: all versions before fix commit 5cd697dfce91
- Patched versions: >= commit 5cd697dfce91
Details
In main.py, _process_authentication_headers() extracts URLs from ASGI headers without validation. In dependencies.py, get_jira_fetcher() creates JiraConfig with url=jira_url_header directly. There is no validate_url call, no IP range check, no hostname validation.
The fix adds URL validation to some paths but the header-based URL extraction in _process_authentication_headers() still passes raw URLs through. The derived config objects use the header URL directly and the fetcher makes HTTP requests to that URL.
PoC
jira_url_header = headers.get(b"x-atlassian-jira-url")
jira_url_str = jira_url_header.decode("latin-1") if jira_url_header else None
service_headers["X-Atlassian-Jira-Url"] = jira_url_str
Steps to reproduce:
git clone https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian /tmp/mcp-atlassian_test
cd /tmp/mcp-atlassian_test && git checkout 5cd697dfce91~1
pip install -e .
python3 poc.py
Expected output:
VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
User-supplied URLs from HTTP headers passed directly to JiraConfig/JiraFetcher with no SSRF validation
Impact
An attacker can set X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ to access AWS instance metadata, or target any internal service. The server makes authenticated HTTP requests to the attacker-specified URL.
Suggested Remediation
Validate all user-supplied URLs against an allowlist of permitted hostnames or reject private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Consider requiring server-side configuration of allowed Atlassian instance URLs.
References
Summary
The
UserTokenMiddlewareextracts URLs fromX-Atlassian-Jira-UrlandX-Atlassian-Confluence-UrlHTTP headers and passes them directly to API client constructors without any SSRF validation.Affected Package
Details
In
main.py,_process_authentication_headers()extracts URLs from ASGI headers without validation. Independencies.py,get_jira_fetcher()createsJiraConfigwithurl=jira_url_headerdirectly. There is novalidate_urlcall, no IP range check, no hostname validation.The fix adds URL validation to some paths but the header-based URL extraction in
_process_authentication_headers()still passes raw URLs through. The derived config objects use the header URL directly and the fetcher makes HTTP requests to that URL.PoC
Steps to reproduce:
git clone https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian /tmp/mcp-atlassian_testcd /tmp/mcp-atlassian_test && git checkout 5cd697dfce91~1pip install -e .python3 poc.pyExpected output:
Impact
An attacker can set
X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/to access AWS instance metadata, or target any internal service. The server makes authenticated HTTP requests to the attacker-specified URL.Suggested Remediation
Validate all user-supplied URLs against an allowlist of permitted hostnames or reject private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Consider requiring server-side configuration of allowed Atlassian instance URLs.
References